











The Politician and his Banker 






















An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the Ifo website www.ifo.de. Ifo Working Paper No. 71 
The Politician and his Banker* 




In the current recession, politicians grant state aid of yet unknown dimensions. But what 
is the most efficient measure for granting such aid? We use a theoretical model with 
firms that differ in their creditworthiness and compare different types of direct subsidies 
with indirectly subsidized loans. We find that, in a large parameter range, politicians 
prefer subsidized loans to direct subsidies, because these avoid windfall gains to entre-
preneurs, and they economize on screening costs. For similar reasons, subsidized loans 
may increase social welfare relative to subsidies. From a welfare perspective, politicians 
use subsidized loans inefficiently often. 
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All around the world, governments face the eminent task of managing a ﬁnancial
crisis and a recession at the same time. In order to mitigate the ﬁnancial crisis,
governments have already spent tremendous amounts of money on acquiring bad
assets or providing new equity, or at least have incurred large amounts of contingent
liabilities by giving guarantees to banks. To limit the eﬀects of the crisis on the real
economy, most governments raise public expenditure. Thus, one crucial question is
how to ﬁnance these expenditures in the most eﬃcient manner. Given the already
huge burden that the rescue measures for banks put on state budgets, governments
must compare the available measures of state aid with respect to their eﬃciency.1
Currently, governments around the world are discussing various measures of state
aid. In the US, the big three car manufacturers asked for ﬁnancial assistance at the
US Senate banking committee in December 2008 and received a bridge loan. Now
a presidential task force, consisting of members from diﬀerent government depart-
ments, evaluates the business plans submitted by the ﬁrms to decide about future
support. However, no decision about the type of measure has yet been chosen.2 In
the European Union, politicians have also demanded subsidies for the automotive
industry, but nor have they speciﬁed the way in which these subsidies should be
granted. Sometimes even the nationalization of ﬁrms has been considered. Some
countries in the EU, for instance Germany, have implemented programs to provide
guarantees to ﬁrms that have temporarily and through no fault of their own got
into diﬃculties in the current crisis (BMWI, 2009). In the UK, the government has
recapitalized banks only under the condition that they commit to further lending to
small ﬁrms, a group of ﬁrms for which access to ﬁnance seems to have become partic-
ularly diﬃcult (CESifo, 2009). This measure is taken to mitigate the credit crunch
resulting from the banks’ extreme reluctance to lend. Due to the credit crunch,
investment projects that have positive net present values and, in normal market
conditions, would be ﬁnanced by private commercial banks are not undertaken.3
Some type of state aid might mitigate this problem.
The underlying question is very general: What is the most eﬃcient measure for a
government to grant state aid? Up to now, the academic literature does not provide
recommendations about which measures of state aid should be favored. Thus, this is
the ﬁrst paper that addresses the following set of questions. Which speciﬁc measure
of granting state aid allows a government to make the most of its expenditures?
How do subsidized loans fare relative to other state aid measures? In particular,
can eﬃciency considerations justify subsidies to banks?
When answering these questions we have to take into account that, in reality, the
politicians in the governments are not necessarily benevolent but may follow their
own agenda. By granting speciﬁc state aid they might, for instance, want to increase
1By state aid we mean all measures that (in expected terms) transfer state resources.
2See White House Press Secretary (2009).
3Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009) provide survey evidence that credit constraints cur-
rently reduce the ﬁrm’s investment.
2the probability of being re-elected (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996).4 We capture
the so-called political view in a theoretical model in which investment projects yield
an externality to the politician. However, projects diﬀer in their creditworthiness.
Some are proﬁtable enough to be ﬁnanced by private banks. Others are only ﬁnanced
if they receive a high enough subsidy. For the politician, it pays to subsidize only
those that have a relatively high probability of success. However, the politician
does not have the necessary skills to assess the creditworthiness of an individual
project. Only so-called credit specialists, who have access to a screening technology,
can determine the creditworthiness. Furthermore, subsidization of projects requires
taxation, and thus entails some distortion that reduces the politician’s utility.
In our model, we discuss all the measures of state aid observed in reality.5 First, the
politician can grant subsidized loans. We call a bank that takes instructions from the
politician, and in return receives a subsidy from the politician, a subsidized bank.
Thus, in some respects, a subsidized bank is similar to a public bank. However, it is
not necessarily owned by the state. Second, he can oﬀer an uninformed subsidy to
all ﬁrms that produce a rent. Third, the politician can grant an informed subsidy by
employing credit specialists as consultants. Based on the resulting information, he
picks out and subsidizes only those projects that need a subsidy to become proﬁtable.
Finally, the politician can create public ﬁrms, or nationalize existing ﬁrms.
Our analysis yields four important results on the eﬃciency of state aid measures.
First, in the case of subsidized loans, the politician restricts competition between the
subsidized bank and other private banks. If this were not the case, the subsidized
bank would use subsidies to capture market shares from private banks and this would
result in a cost for the politician without yielding an additional beneﬁt. Second, the
politician prefers subsidized loans to informed subsidies because this reduces the
amount of screening costs he has to bear. Using a subsidized bank means that the
burden of screening ﬁrms that are not the targets of the politician’s intervention is
born by the private banks. In a large parameter range, subsidized loans even welfare-
dominate informed subsidies. Third, subsidized loans can dominate the uninformed
subsidies. This happens if the windfall gains for the most creditworthy ﬁrms, because
the politician cannot prevent them from taking the uninformed subsidy, are large
relative to the screening costs of the subsidized bank. Finally, the politician uses
the subsidized bank ineﬃciently often. The reason is that the politician does not
take into account the duplication of screening costs.
Our paper is related to the literature on state aid and since we investigate subsidized
loans, also to the literature on development banks or, more generally, on public
banks. The papers on state aid evaluate state aid control by multilateral institutions
such as the European Commission (Collie, 2000; Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006).
To the best of our knowledge there are no papers that compare diﬀerent measures
of state aid. This is also an open point in the literature on development or public
banks.
4This behavior is also found between states. Empirical evidence shows that the US government
gives ﬁnancial favors to countries that hold a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council (Kuziemko
and Werker, 2006).
5These measures match with the ones proposed by the European Commission (1998)
3In the only theoretical paper about development banks, Armend´ ariz de Aghion
(1999) also argues that interventions by development banks must be targeted. In
fact, the development banks in Germany, Japan, France and Korea are operating in
a notably successful way (United Nations, 2005). The Development Bank of Japan
(DBJ) can serve as an example showing that directed lending can work. Originally,
its purpose has been to ﬁnance the modernization of the Japanese economy after
World War II. The management of the DBJ has been politically independent and
has based its decisions on the professional judgement of its loan department.6 As a
matter of fact, the DBJ has kept the level of loan losses much lower than the private
ﬁnancial sector (Vittas and Cho, 1995).
The theoretical literature on public banks shows that they can foster economic
development (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2006). They also have positive eﬀects on the
ﬁnancial system by contributing to its stability (Allen and Gale, 2004; Andrianova,
Demetriades, and Shortland, 2008). It might happen that public banks operate with
a soft budget constraint because the government cannot commit to not reﬁnancing
poorly performing public banks (Kornai, 1980; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).
Empirical evidence with respect to the eﬃciency of public banks is mixed. A cross-
country study shows that in countries with higher government ownership of banks,
both ﬁnancial development and growth rates per capita are lower (La Porta, Lopez
De Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). This result could be due to soft budget constraints
of public banks, but no causal links are tested in this study. At the same time, there
is evidence that public banks operate as eﬃciently as their competitors (Altunbas,
Evans, and Molyneux, 2001), which is not consistent with the hypothesis that public
banks operate with a soft budget constraint. Since public banks play an important
role in providing state aid and are a means by which the politician can pursue
economic policy, we believe that a comparison between public and private banks
neglects the fact that the objectives of public banks are diﬀerent from those of
private banks. Therefore, such a comparison might be misleading.
We choose to model a politician that pursues his own objectives. There are several
papers supporting this political view. The fact that, in election years, public banks
increase their lending more than private banks suggests that politicians try to in-
crease the probability of being re-elected (Din¸ c, 2005; Cole, 2009). Evidence from
Pakistan shows that politically connected ﬁrms get larger loans from public banks
than unconnected ﬁrms, pay lower interest rates and have higher default rates.7
Remarkably, about 25 per cent of the loans from public banks are granted by banks
that explicitly have social objectives. Interestingly, these banks are not used to favor
politically connected ﬁrms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Moreover, after the deregula-
tion of the French banking sector that started in 1985, bank debt declined sharply,
especially for poorly performing ﬁrms which, as a consequence, were more likely to
exit (Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2007). In line with this evidence, our model
argues that some entrepreneurs, although they create a rent for the politician, do not
6The World Bank provides recommendations for good corporate governance of state ﬁnancial
institutions (Scott, 2007).
7It thus seems that politicians exercise inﬂuence on bank employees in order to grant favors to
connected ﬁrms.
4receive ﬁnance from private banks but are ﬁnanced by public banks. Therefore, we
predict that after deregulation these poorly performing ﬁrms are no longer ﬁnanced.
All these studies clearly indicate that politicians use state aid granted through public
banks to pursue their own goals. These studies also point out the important role the
electorate plays in monitoring politicians by showing, for instance, that the rents
granted by politicians decrease if electoral participation increases (Sapienza, 2004;
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Cole, 2009). None of the studies, however, compares the
costs of granting subsidies through a public bank with other means of subsidization.
We ﬁll this gap by comparing the eﬃciency of diﬀerent means of subsidization from
the political view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the set-
up of the model. We describe diﬀerent measures to directly or indirectly subsidize
projects in section 3. In section 4, we compare these measures from the politician’s
perspective, and from a social welfare perspective. In section 5, we discuss the
results and conclude.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with three groups of agents; entrepreneurs, credit specialists,
and a politician. All agents are risk neutral, and there is no discounting. En-
trepreneurs want to undertake investment projects but do not have their own funds
and must credit ﬁnance their projects. Since each entrepreneur has only one project,
we use the expressions project and entrepreneur interchangeably.
There are three types of entrepreneurs of mass m1, m2 and m3, with m1 + m2 +
m3 = 1. Each of them has a project that requires an investment of I and that leads
to a return of Y with probability p1, p2 and p3, depending on the type, stochastically
independent, with p1 > p2 > p3, otherwise it returns 0. Hence, diﬀerent projects
have diﬀerent degrees of creditworthiness. Type 1 projects are called excellent; type
2 projects are called medium; type 3 projects are called bad. We will give conditions
on the success probability later in this section. We assume that only entrepreneurs
know their own type; the other agents do not.
A credit specialist carries out a credit analysis before granting a loan. He spends
eﬀort c to ﬁnd out the success probability p of a project because ﬁnancing without
conducting a creditworthiness test yields an expected loss, i.e., (m1 p1 + m2 p2 +
m3 p3)Y < (m1+m2+m3)I. The result of the credit analysis is observable only for
the credit specialist who conducts it and not to anybody else. Moreover, it is noisy:
with probability 1−ε, the bank receives an informative signal, with probability ε > 0,
it gets a random signal, distributed like the types of entrepreneurs. Hence, the signal
is “excellent” with probability m1, “medium” with probability m2, and “bad” with
probability m3. Consequently, the probability of success of an entrepreneur with an
“excellent” rating is
P1 := (1 − ε)p1 + ε(m1p1 + m2 p2 + m3 p3), (1)
5Figure 1: Time Structure in the Absence of Subsidies
t = 0 • Credit specialists (banks) ﬁx their loan rates.
• Entrepreneurs can choose a credit specialist and apply for a loan.
• Credit specialists choose whether to analyze the projects. If they
analyze, they spend c and learn the probability of default.
• Credit specialists choose whether to grant loans at the proposed rate.
If they do, they reﬁnance from investors.
• Entrepreneurs who get a loan carry out their project.
t = 1 • Projects mature. If possible, debt is paid back.
P2 and P3 are deﬁned analogously, Pi = (1 − ε)pi + ε
P
j mj pj. Note that P1 < p1
and P3 > p3. The assumption of a noisy screening technology implies that even bad
entrepreneurs apply for loans because if they receive a loan by mistake, they make
positive proﬁts. We use quotes to refer to entrepreneurs with an excellent rating
(“excellent”), but who do not necessarily have excellent projects and equivalently
for other types and ratings. Throughout, ε will be arbitrarily small.
There is perfect competition between a ﬁnite number of credit specialists. Diﬀerent
specialists make the same screening mistakes, hence their signals are perfectly cor-
related. This assumption implies that rejected entrepreneurs do not apply again at
another bank if they know they will be rejected again; this is consistent with the
evidence in Shaﬀer (1998). We assume that all banks can raise funds at the same
costs and normalize these costs to zero.
In our model a politician maximizes his own utility. He gets a rent Xpol from suc-
cessful projects.8 The rent could be interpreted as the beneﬁt he gets from increasing
the probability of being re-elected if a project is carried out and is successful. In
order to have projects realized, the politician can subsidize them. If he wants to
grant subsidies, he must collect taxes. Like in Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996),
dpol is the disutility that the politician suﬀers for each unit of tax he raises. The
politician wants to maximize his net utility, i.e., Xpol times the number of successful
projects that are carried out, net of the required taxation times dpol.9
The projects can be ranked as follows: An excellent project has a success probability
p1 high enough for the project to be ﬁnanced without the help of the politician,
p1 Y > I + c/m1, taking into account the costs of screening. Both medium and bad
projects have a negative net present value (NPV), p2 Y < I and p3 Y < I. However,
the probability of success of a medium project is higher than that of a bad project,
p3 < p2. We assume that the politician increases his utility by subsidizing medium
projects, i.e., p2 Xpol > dpol (I − p2 Y ), but not by subsidizing bad projects, i.e.,
p3 Xpol < dpol (I − p3 Y ).
8The politicians interests do not necessarily need to conﬂict with welfare. Welfare eﬀects will
be discussed in Section 4.2.
9The study by Khwaja and Mian (2005) shows that the social costs of lending to politically
connected ﬁrms is high—the direct costs of politically connected lending are about 1.6 per cent
of GDP per year. In addition, the deadweight loss from levying these transfer payments from the
taxpayer are estimated to be about 0.15–0.30 per cent of annual GDP.
6The timeline for the credit market game, in the absence of any subsidies, is given in
Figure 1. However, in the case where the politician grants state aid, the time line
is incomplete. Before the credit market game starts, the politician has to announce
what kind of subsidy to grant, and at which point in time. Potentially, the politician
could grant state aid before or after entrepreneurs apply at private banks for a loan.
Depending on the timing, the design of the measure changes. We will present
diﬀerent possible solutions, ﬁnding that they are comparable to those proposed by
the European Commission (1998).
3 Measures of State Aid
In this section, we discuss diﬀerent types of measures that the politician may use
to subsidize projects in order to get the corresponding rents. To deﬁne a point of
reference, we start with the zero intervention case, the laissez faire case.
3.1 Laissez Faire
Consider the case where the politician does not inﬂuence which projects are under-
taken and therefore does not need to collect taxes. Because the average NPV of a
project is negative, entrepreneurs will have to be screened in equilibrium. The timing
in the laissez-faire case is exactly as described in Figure 1. One institutional possi-
bility is that credit specialists act as intermediaries between investors, from whom
they collect funds at zero cost, and entrepreneurs. They will screen entrepreneurs,
sorting out “medium” and “bad” ones. Hence, credit specialists endogenously act
as private bankers. In the appendix, we prove the following lemma, furthermore
deriving the necessary conditions.
Lemma 1 (Laissez Faire) In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs apply for loans









The politician’s utility is
U
LF
pol = m1 P1 Xpol. (3)
Proof: See the Appendix. In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs, even the bad and
medium ones, apply for loans at private banks. Bad and medium entrepreneurs an-
ticipate that banks will give them a blurred rating with probability ε, and hence give
them a loan with positive probability. All entrepreneurs only apply once, because
of the assumption that the screening results are perfectly correlated. If a once re-
jected entrepreneur applied again, he would only receive another rejection. Without
7screening costs, the gross loan rate, consisting of the repayment of the principal and
the markup for default risk, would be I/P1. Note that this rate is higher than I/p1,
because the bank acknowledges that it misjudges the entrepreneur’s creditworthiness
with some probability. In order to break even, the bank’s lending rate must cover
the whole screening cost. Because a fraction m1 of applicants is accepted, banks
must add c/(m1 P1) to the gross loan rate.
The politician’s utility function (3) is determined by the utility Xpol he derives from
each successful project. The fraction of projects that are ﬁnanced is m1, the fraction
of successful projects, is m1 P1. Among the projects rated as “excellent”, not only
will the excellent projects be successful with probability p1, but also some medium
projects that receive a loan by mistake with probability p2 and some bad projects
with probability p3. Of course, in the laissez faire case, no taxation is needed.
3.2 Uninformed Subsidies
One natural way of boosting the implementation of medium projects is to grant a
direct subsidy. In principle, the politician could grant a subsidy to each project.
Since projects generate beneﬁts of Xpol for the politician but also costs in the form
of a disutility dpol for each additional unit of tax revenue, the politician wants to
minimize the costs through taxation. To do so, he can use additional pieces of
information. In our model, there are two observables that he could base his decision
on. The ﬁrst is whether a ﬁrm produces, which is only possible if it receives a loan
from a bank. The second is whether a project is successful or not. If the politician
pays out the subsidy only to ﬁrms that failed, the state aid measure is called a
guarantee. Note that the politician cannot directly use the information generated
by credit specialists because screening results are unobservable. Potentially, when
the politician announces the subsidy, which happens before the credit market game
starts, there are several dates at which the subsidies will be paid (see Figure 1): in
t=0 before banks grant loans or before investment is undertaken, or in t = 1 after
repayment. We look for the optimal timing and the optimal structure of subsidies.
Lemma 2 (Uninformed Subsidy) The politician grants a limited deﬁcit guaran-
tee to entrepreneurs by committing to a subsidy of
S
US =
I − P2 Y
1 − P2
(4)
to all entrepreneurs that produce but are not successful at date t = 1. In equilibrium,
all types of entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks. Those entrepreneurs who
are rated “excellent” and “medium” get a loan at rate
R1 =







I − (1 − P2)SUS
P2
= Y, (6)







mi Pi Xpol − dpol mi (1 − Pi)S
US￿
. (7)
Proof: See the Appendix. In equilibrium, the politician grants a subsidy that is
just high enough to guarantee the implementation of “medium” projects. Not only
“medium” but also “excellent” entrepreneurs take the subsidy and, as a result, “ex-
cellent” entrepreneurs receive windfall gains. For “bad” entrepreneurs, the subsidy
is insuﬃcient to allow private ﬁnance. Hence without a project, they will not get
subsidies in the ﬁrst place. The Lemma shows that, optimally, the politician pays
his subsidy at the end of period t = 1.
Naturally, the politician does not want to waste tax revenues, he wants to minimize
these windfall gains. He can do this by making the subsidy contingent on observable
variables. If he pays a subsidy only in the case of an entrepreneur’s default in which
case the subsidy is in fact a guarantee, potentially partial, then the expected subsidy
to an “excellent” entrepreneur is lower than that to a “medium” entrepreneur and
the politician saves tax revenues.10 Within the class of uninformed subsidies, partial
guarantees waste the least tax money.
The size of the expected subsidy depends on the loan rate, which is endogenous.
Projects cannot repay more than Y in the case of success. Since the resulting
expected repayment is too low for the bank to recover I, the missing amount has
to be covered by a guarantee. Of course, if interest rates are high, the politician
must pay a higher subsidy. Interest rates are determined by price competition
between banks. Relative to “medium” entrepreneurs, “excellent” entrepreneurs pay
a lower interest rate because they have a lower default risk. However, “excellent”
entrepreneurs must bear all screening costs, due to a selection mechanism. Assume
that one of the banks demands exceptionally low loan rates from their “excellent”
borrowers and commits to oﬀering loans to “excellent” borrowers only. Then this
bank would attract not only all excellent projects but also bad and medium ones.
The latter groups also apply because, with lower loans rates, their expected proﬁt
increases. All ﬁrms would have to be screened. As a consequence, the costs of
screening are born by “excellent” borrowers. Since “medium” entrepreneurs cannot
repay more than Y , the size of the subsidy equals the (negative) NPV, I − P2 Y ,
plus a markup for the default risk because it is paid only in the case of default.
For the politician’s utility, note that, due to the subsidy, not only the “excellent”
but also the “medium” projects are implemented. However, the subsidy is also paid
to both “excellent” and “medium” entrepreneurs.
10In our model, there is no moral hazard problem, entrepreneurs cannot inﬂuence their success
probability. In the presence of moral hazard, a deﬁcit guarantee might no longer be the optimal
form of an uninformed subsidy.
93.3 Subsidized Loans
Subsidized banks receive a subsidy from the politician, but are instructed by the
politician to grant subsidized loans. A subsidized bank employs credit specialists
who screen projects. Bankers at the subsidized bank are assumed to behave indi-
vidually rational, given the constraints implemented by the politician’s instructions.
Whether a subsidized loan is granted depends on the screening result. There is
also an additional level of intermediation, and the politician must respect incentive
compatibility problems.
All instructions for the banker at the subsidized bank need to be based on vari-
ables that are observable by the politician. For example, the politician can set a
loan rate ﬂoor; the subsidized bank must then grant loans at rates that are above
some threshold level, or above the rate of their private competitors. However, the
politician cannot instruct bankers to grant loans only to “medium” entrepreneurs.
The timing is as follows: Before the credit market game starts, the politician en-
dows the subsidized bank with a certain subsidy and gives instructions to the banker.
Then the credit market game starts in which the subsidized bank and the private
bank announce their rates simultaneously. Firms can make their applications se-
quentially.
Lemma 3 (Subsidized Loans) The politician grants a subsidy to the (subsidized)
banks in the amount of
S
SL = I + c − P2 Y (8)
per loan. Furthermore, he will restrict competition between the subsidized bank and
the private banks, e.g., by forbidding the subsidized bank to match a private banks’
loan rate. In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks.
Those entrepreneurs that are rated “excellent” receive an oﬀer from a private bank.
Those that are rated “medium” apply at the subsidized bank and get an oﬀer. Equi-







and R2 = Y. (9)









− dpol m2 S
SL. (10)
Proof: See the Appendix. All entrepreneurs apply for loans at the private banks
because they oﬀer favorable interest rates for entrepreneurs with “excellent” rating.
Therefore, the loan rate is just like that in the laissez faire case. Entrepreneurs,
who are rejected from a private bank because they are only “medium”, apply at the
subsidized bank and here they must pay the complete return Y from their project
to the subsidized bank. From this return alone, the expected proﬁt of the subsidized
10bank would still be negative. Hence, the politician must compensate the banker at
the subsidized bank for the expected loss per loan, I − p2 Y . Furthermore, he must
pay the banker, at the subsidized bank, a wage for his screening eﬀort, m2 c. Note
that bad entrepreneurs do not apply at the subsidized bank.
Lemma 3 contains a timing result. Entrepreneurs ﬁrst try to get a loan from a private
bank, who oﬀers more favorable loan rates. Even medium and bad entrepreneurs
apply because of the noise within the screening technology. After learning that the
screening result is “medium” (which may happen even to an excellent entrepreneur),
the entrepreneur then proceeds to a subsidized bank. After learning that the screen-
ing result is “bad”, the entrepreneur does not need to apply again: due to the
assumptions that screening results are perfectly correlated, “bad” entrepreneurs an-
ticipate they will be rejected again. Hence endogenously, entrepreneurs ﬁrst try
to get a loan from a private bank. This saves the subsidized bank (and thus, the
politician) screening costs.
Importantly, the subsidized bank must not be allowed to compete with private banks.
The reason is simple: if an entrepreneur gets a loan oﬀer from a private bank, this
implies that the help of the subsidized bank is not needed. If the subsidized bank
really did undercut the private bank and gave a subsidized loan to this entrepreneur,
he would just waste tax revenues. In the extreme case where the subsidized bank
always undercuts private loan oﬀers, there is a complete crowding out of private
ﬁnance by the public sector, and the waste of tax revenues would be the same as
with an uninformed subsidy.
How independent of the politician is the subsidized bank? It does not belong to
the politician in the sense that the politician is the residual claimant. The banker
at the subsidized bank himself must be the residual claimant, otherwise he would
not have any incentives to screen. However, the politician must be able to give the
subsidized bank instructions. He thus needs some right to punish the banker at the
subsidized bank, e.g., to cut the subsidy, or to sack the banker. When comparing a
subsidized bank to uninformed subsidies, we get the following result.
Proposition 1 The politician prefers a subsidized bank to uninformed subsidies if





(I − P2 Y ). (11)
Proof: See the Appendix. In both cases, with the uninformed subsidy or with
the subsidized loan, projects with an “excellent” or a “medium” rating are carried
out. In neither case are projects with a “bad” rating ﬁnanced. In both cases, the
politician must subsidize “medium” projects, to raise their NPV to at least zero.
Hence the (possibly indirect) expected subsidy to a “medium” entrepreneur is the
same in both cases. However, the politician faces the following trade-oﬀ. On the one
hand, with an uninformed subsidy (partial guarantee), he also grants uninformed
subsidies to “excellent” entrepreneurs who take the subsidy and experience a windfall
gain. On the other hand, with a subsidized loan, he must remunerate his banker at
the subsidized bank for screening. Hence, the politician prefers a subsidized loan if
screening costs are not too large.
113.4 Informed Subsidies
The politician may want to use the information generated by a credit specialist
instead of only relying on observables. At the same time, he may also want to avoid
directly interfering in the ﬁnancial system.11 In our model, we capture the informed
subsidy as follows: the politician can delegate the assessment of creditworthiness
to a credit specialist who informs the politician which entrepreneurs to subsidize.
Given incentive compatibility, only “medium” entrepreneurs will get subsidies. The
result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Informed Subsidies) A politician seeks advice from a consultant be-
fore subsidizing, if his consultant rates an entrepreneur as “medium”, he grants a
subsidy of
S
IS = I − P2Y. (12)
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs with “medium” or “excellent” ratings apply for loans




and R2 = I + (1 − P2)Y. (13)






mi Pi Xpol − dpol m2 S
IS − dpol c. (14)
Proof: See the Appendix. For entrepreneurs, it is optimal to ﬁrst apply for a subsidy
and then try to get a loan. The politician will grant a subsidy of exactly I − P2 Y ,
lifting the expected proﬁt for a “medium” entrepreneur to exactly zero, such that
“medium” projects can be ﬁnanced by private banks. An entrepreneur can prove to
the bank that he is “medium” by showing that he receives a subsidy. The reason is
that only “medium” projects are subsidized, and the results of the credit analysis
are perfectly correlated; bankers would not generate any new useful information by
a further credit analysis. This implies that the private bank does not have to screen
them again. Therefore, screening costs c do not enter into the interest rates for
subsidized projects. For the same reason, entrepreneurs that get a “bad” rating
from the consultant will not apply for a private loan. Interestingly, the interest rate
for “medium” entrepreneurs depends on Y : the repayment to the bank is Y + SIS
in the case of success, and only SIS under failure. An increase in Y induces the
politician to reduce the subsidy, but not to the same degree. Hence, the maximum
payment to the bank, Y +S, depends positively on Y . When comparing subsidized
loans to informed subsidies, we get the following result.
11In practice, proposals are submitted to the program manager in a ministry and are pre-
screened, short-listed and evaluated by a team of experts on the basis of their scientiﬁc and
economic merits. Eventually, starting with those projects with the best grades, the projects are
graded and projects are ﬁnanced until the budget is exhausted (Giebe, Grebe, and Wolfstetter,
2006).
12Proposition 2 The politician prefers subsidized loans to informed subsidies.
Proof: See the Appendix. If the politician pays the subsidy through a subsidized
bank, then, for the entrepreneur, getting the subsidy comes at the cost of paying
a relatively high loan rate. Consequently, excellent entrepreneurs do not apply for
loans at a subsidized bank in the ﬁrst place. This saves screening costs for the subsi-
dized bank, which are indirectly paid for with tax revenues from the politician. If, as
an alternative, the politician pays the subsidy after screening applicants, excellent
entrepreneurs have an incentive to apply for the subsidy because, in expected terms,
they make a windfall gain as the credit specialist may make a mistake. Hence, all
entrepreneurs apply for the subsidy, and the politician must foot the bill by paying
higher screening costs.
3.5 Public Firms
Alternatively, the politician can create his own ﬁrm. However, because he does not
have the ability to carry out projects, he would need to employ entrepreneurs.12 To
employ them, he needs to oﬀer them a wage. Thus, the timing is as follows. First,
the politician announces that he intends to create public ﬁrms and makes a wage
oﬀer. Next, the credit market game takes place. Then, entrepreneurs can decide
whether to accept the wage oﬀered or not.
The politician can choose to have large public ﬁrms with a continuum of entrepreneurs
(such that the law of large numbers applies within a ﬁrm), or to have many small
ﬁrms (such that the law of large number applies between ﬁrms). Each of these cases
leads to identical allocations, hence we consider only the ﬁrst case. Also, note that
the politician does not need to pay the complete investment of public ﬁrms with tax
revenues. He can take a loan from investors, and guarantee the repayment. That
way, credit specialists (private banks) are not even needed as intermediaries between
investors and public ﬁrms. Loans from public ﬁrms are perfectly safe, like a treasury
bond; they do not need to be screened and can be directly traded on the capital
market.
Lemma 5 (Public Firms) In equilibrium, the politician pays zero wages to his
employees. All entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks. Entrepreneurs rated
as “medium” or “bad” are rejected; they become state employees. The aggregate tax





mi (I − Pi Y ). (15)
12In the light of the recent developments, the interpretation would be to “nationalize” a ﬁrm in
distress by buying up its shares (in case of joint-stock companies), rather than giving it guarantees
or capital injections.












Proof: See the Appendix. “Excellent” ﬁrms do not accept the oﬀer because they
receive a loan and make positive proﬁts when conducting the project on their own.
Here, the aggregate subsidy equals the aggregate (negative) net present values of
“medium” and “bad” projects. The state guarantees the repayment of the loans
of its ﬁrm, then competition between private banks guarantees that the value of
these guarantees equals exactly the negative net present value. Because all types of
projects are carried out in equilibrium, the politician’s utility contains the external-
ities of all three types.
4 Comparison of Measures of State Aid
4.1 The Politician’s Choice
Depending on the parameter constellations, the politician chooses the optimal state
aid measure. We illustrate the politician’s choice in Figure 2 for certain parameter
values and plot the optimal measure for the politician.13 Curves mark the borders
between the optimal types of aid. Clearly, the measure that the politician picks
depends on the parameters c and dpol. As stated in the above propositions, in-
formed subsidies are dominated by subsidized loans, and uninformed subsidies are
dominated by subsidized loans if c is not too large.
For relatively high dpol, the costs of intervention are so high that the politician
prefers not to interfere at all (laissez faire). For very low dpol, the politician prefers
to have all projects ﬁnanced and hence uses public ﬁrms to carry out projects. That
way, he beneﬁts from the rent Xpol from “medium” projects, avoiding the screening
costs c, but has to accept that “bad” projects are also carried out. For medium dpol
and not too large c, the politician will choose subsidized loans. In this range, the
politician prefers subsidized loans to public ﬁrms because his costs of taxation dpol
are relatively high. This disadvantage is high enough to compensate the politician
for giving up the rent of “bad” projects, which are not undertaken with subsidized
loans. The politician prefers subsidized loans to laissez faire because the costs of
raising taxes are low enough to justify the realization of “medium” projects, which
would not be undertaken in the laissez faire case. For medium dpol and larger c,
the politician will choose an uninformed subsidy. In this range, his utility is higher
if he grants subsidies to “excellent” entrepreneurs but economizes on bearing the
screening costs of the subsidized bank.
13For the plot, we ﬁx parameters at I = 1.0, Y = 1.3, p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.7, p3 = 0.5, m1 = 1/2,
m2 = m3 = 1/4, ε small (we take the limiting case of ε → 0), and Xpol = 0.2.
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Now suppose that, for some reason, subsidized banks and subsidized loans are not
an option. In Figure 3, we show how the politician’s choice changes. In the light
gray region, the politician opts for an informed subsidy, which was dominated by
the subsidized loan before. The regions in which the politician chooses laissez faire,
uninformed subsidies, or public ﬁrms have increased.
This exercise also allows us to study the argument, made by Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), that a politician reduces the number of interventions if the costs of an in-
tervention increase. Our analysis comes to a diﬀerent result. In the white regions,
the politician’s behavior is not aﬀected by whether or not he has access to subsi-
dized loans. For low dpol in the dark gray region, the politician implements public
ﬁrms. This means that now a mass of m2 + m3 entrepreneurs enjoy being a public
ﬁrm, and the degree of state intervention increases. For medium dpol in the lightly
shaded region, the politician switches to an informed or uninformed subsidy and the
mass of subsidized entrepreneurs remains unchanged, but the cost of subsidization
increases. Only for relatively high dpol in the strongly shaded region, do we have
the same result as Shleifer and Vishny; instead of using subsidized loans for indirect
subsidization, the politician chooses laissez faire. Hence, how the degree of state
intervention changes if subsidized loans are no longer available depends crucially on
the alternative options of the politician, on the characteristics of the project (Xpol,
c, m, p and ε), and on the politician’s costs of increasing taxes (dpol).
4.2 Social Welfare
In this section, we compute social welfare for the ﬁve diﬀerent measures of state
aid. In our current set-up of the model, projects lead to an externality on the
politician (the rent Xpol), but not on the public. Additionally, let us assume that
the implementation of a project also inﬂuences social welfare, leading to a social
externality of Xsoc.14 For Xsoc > 0, not only the politician but also the public beneﬁts
14Without loss of generality, let us assume that the externality to the politician is also already
contained in Xsoc; otherwise, the aggregate social externality from a successful project would add
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from a successful project. For Xsoc < 0, the project even has a negative eﬀect on
public welfare and medium projects should never be undertaken.15 Furthermore, we
must take into account that taxation leads to a social distortion that is proportional
to the tax, dsoc. Note that, even for Xpol = Xsoc and dpol = dsoc, the politician does
not always pick the welfare-optimal subsidization measure. Social welfare takes into
account proﬁts and losses of third parties (e.g., private banks or entrepreneurs), but
the politician’s utility function does not.
Aggregate welfare from a social perspective consists of the NPV of projects including
the social externality, weighted by the mass of types ﬁnanced, net of the costs of
taxation, and the costs of screening.
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Proof: See the Appendix. If Xsoc is not too small, subsidized loans can even welfare-
dominate the laissez faire regime. However, if Xsoc is small, zero or even negative,
up to Xsoc + Xpol.
15If the negative externality is large, even the impact of an excellent project on social welfare
can be negative. However, the measures we study here cannot be used to avoid excellent projects
being undertaken in this case.
16then laissez faire is the optimal policy. This is obvious from comparing the welfare
of the diﬀerent regimes. For rather small dsoc, positive Xsoc and large c, it can be
optimal to have public ﬁrms even from a social perspective. The public wants the
externality, taxation is not very costly, and screening (even by subsidized banks)
is prohibitively costly. Comparing the diﬀerent measures, we derive the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Subsidized loans welfare-dominate uninformed subsidies iﬀ







(I − P2 Y ); (17)





Proof: See the Appendix. If there are more excellent than medium projects in
the economy (m1 > m2), then condition (18) is satisﬁed for all dsoc ≥ 0. As with
a politician who maximizes his own utility, subsidized loans can welfare dominate
both informed and uninformed subsidies. In comparison to the uninformed subsidy,
subsidized loans avoid the windfall gains to “excellent” entrepreneurs. Thereby,
the deadweight loss of taxation decreases. However, the total screening costs with
subsidized loans are higher because entrepreneurs rated as “medium” apply twice (at
the private bank and after the rating at the subsidized bank). As long as screening
costs are not too high, the subsidized bank is the more eﬃcient measure for granting
state aid also from a social welfare perspective.
Next, we compare informed subsidies and subsidized loans in terms of social welfare.
We ﬁnd that on the one hand the screening costs for “excellent” projects are dupli-
cated under the informed subsidy, and the costs of screening all entrepreneurs must
be ﬁnanced by tax revenues. On the other hand, with subsidized loans the screen-
ing costs of “medium” entrepreneurs are duplicated, but only the costs of screening
“medium” entrepreneurs through the subsidized bank are ﬁnanced by taxes. Thus,
for high enough m1, social welfare is higher with subsidized loans. The higher the
costs of taxation, the lower the threshold value of m1 where the subsidized loans
become the more favorable alternative.
Given the result of Proposition 3 we want to know whether the politician chooses
to use a subsidized loans when it is the best choice from the point of view of social
welfare. We can prove the following result.
Proposition 4 The politician uses subsidized loans ineﬃciently often.
Proof: See the Appendix. The explanation for the discrepancy is that the politician
does not take into account screening costs and, in particular, the duplication of
screening costs. For him screening costs only matter if they have to be covered by
17the subsidy. When comparing the threshold values where the politician switches
from using subsidized loans to using uninformed subsidies to the threshold value
where social welfare changes, we can show that the threshold value is higher for
the politician. The reason is that the politician does not take into account that
the screening costs for “medium” entrepreneurs arise twice because he does not
care about the costs of private banks. Moreover, the politician always prefers the
subsidized loans to informed subsidies. However, as shown in Proposition 3, there
exist parameter ranges where informed subsidies are more eﬃcient from a welfare
perspective.16
This section has made four points. First, and almost trivially so, laissez faire is the
ﬁrst best alternative if the social externality of projects is negative, Xsoc ≤ 0. Second,
subsidized loans can be welfare-optimal if Xsoc > 0. Third, in a large parameter
range, subsidized loans welfare-dominate both the informed and the uninformed
subsidies (Proposition 3). Finally, politicians use subsidized loans ineﬃciently often
(Proposition 4).17
5 Conclusion
Diﬀerent measures of state aid have been discussed and used during the recent ﬁnan-
cial crisis. The above model helps compare their eﬃciency, both from a politician’s
point of view and from a welfare perspective. Take, for instance, the case of car
manufacturers. Diﬀerent ﬁrms diﬀer in their future prospects, and hence in their
creditworthiness. Firms that manage to keep their production alive yield a beneﬁt
for both politicians and society. They keep their workers employed and generate
demand on input markets. Consequently, if ﬁrms are on the verge of closing down
their production, some intervention may be appropriate. However, the rescue plans
come at the cost of raising additional taxes or reducing other public expenditures.
Therefore, the politician needs to grant state aid in the most eﬃcient manner. Nei-
ther does he want to give tax money to healthy ﬁrms, nor does he want to waste
money on hopeless ﬁrms. Hence, our model environment ﬁts exactly.
The analysis shows that, from the politician’s perspective, there is no dominant
institutional design. Depending on circumstances, a diﬀerent measure of state aid
will be optimal. Even nationalizing a ﬁrm can be adequate, but only if distortions
from taxation are very low (see Figure 2).18 Doing nothing can be optimal if dis-
tortions from taxation are extremely high. In between, there is a range where the
state should intervene, making use of some type of subsidization. In the paper,
16Note that the result of Proposition 4 is independent of the size of dpol relative to dsoc.
17However, it is also conceivable that the public prefers laissez faire (because Xsoc is small), and
the politician switches from subsidized loans to laissez faire if subsidized loans are banned (hence
he is in the densely shaded region of Figure 3).
18If globalization renders taxation more expensive, this leads to less state-owned ﬁrms or more
privatization. The idea is that through globalization some factors of production become more
mobile, and it becomes more diﬃcult to tax them. As a result, immobile factors have to bear a
higher tax burden and, thereby, the deadweight loss of taxation increases (European Economic
Advisory Group, 2007).
18we have shown that uninformed subsidies through partial guarantees are optimal if
information costs are relatively high. If they are lower, subsidizing banks is opti-
mal, because for the politician, covering the screening costs of the subsidized bank
is cheaper than granting a windfall gain to excellent ﬁrms. In both of these cases,
the preferred institution comprises elements of both markets and of the state. In
the case of partial guarantees, the state grants the guarantees; prices and allocation
are then organized by the banking market. In the case of subsidized banks, we
have argued that the state should subsidize some (not all) banks, and prohibit these
banks from competing with other unsubsidized banks. That way, market forces or-
ganize a targeting of the subsidies. Bad ﬁrms do not get loans at all. Medium ﬁrms
get loans at rather unfavorable but still subsidized rates and can invest. Excellent
ﬁrms take loans at more favorable rates; reﬂecting their high solvency, from private,
unsubsidized banks. Finally, with respect to social welfare, our analysis has shown
that optimal institutional designs are similar to the politicians’ preferred choices,
but politicians subsidize banks ineﬃciently often.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Because banks make mistakes with positive probability, and
a loan application is not costly to entrepreneurs, all types of entrepreneurs will
apply for loans. Of all these applicants, a fraction m1 is excellent, hence the bank’s
reﬁnancing costs are m1 I. The entrepreneurs who get the loan are of mixed quality,
their probability of success is P1 as deﬁned in (1). The expected proﬁt for the bank
is hence
Π = m1 P1 R1 − m1 I − c.
Due to the assumption of perfect competition, the expected proﬁt from a loan must
be zero. Solving for R1 yields (2).
Under what conditions does a banker reject entrepreneurs with a “medium” rating?
When the screening costs are already sunk, the expected proﬁt from a “medium”
entrepreneur is Π = m2 P2 R2−m2 I. The banker can demand a loan rate of at most
R2 = Y . A suﬃcient condition that bankers reject entrepreneurs with a “medium”
rating is thus P2 Y < I. For small ε, this inequality becomes p2 Y < I; medium
projects must have a negative NPV. The expected return from entrepreneurs with a
“bad” rating is even lower, they will also be rejected under the above condition. In
order to have intermediated ﬁnance, the return from a screened loan must exceed
that from an unscreened loan, Π ≥ ¯ pY = [m1 p1 + m2 p2 + m3 p3]Y . This term is
assumed to be negative, hence ﬁnance is always intermediated.
The politician derives utility Xpol from all successful projects. Projects that get
ﬁnance (mass m1) are successful with probability P1, hence the politician’s utility is
given by (3). For small ε, the politician’s utility is approximately m1 p1 Xpol. ￿
19Proof of Lemma 2. We show that the politician cannot improve upon the sub-
sidy described in the lemma. The necessary subsidy depends on the loan rates for
diﬀerent entrepreneurs, so we have to determine these rates ﬁrst.
Step 1: Determine loan rates. Note that banks must make their interest rate
oﬀers contingent on the rating of the entrepreneur. Since a bank oﬀered the same
loan rate for all classes of entrepreneurs, this rate would have to be relatively high,
hence especially entrepreneurs with “excellent” ratings would rather go to banks
with attractive loan oﬀers for “excellent” entrepreneurs. A bank that grants loans










However, the interest rates for “excellent” projects R1 cannot be arbitrarily high. For
too high a R1, banks that specialize on “excellent” projects could emerge and attract
excellent projects with a lower R1. Because banks err with positive probability,
medium and bad projects would also try to get a loan from these banks. Hence, the
expected proﬁt of such a bank out of equilibrium would be
Π1 = m1 (P1 R1 + (1 − P1)S
US − I) − c.
If both Π1,2 = 0 and Π1 = 0, then the interest rates constitute an equilibrium; no
bank can improve proﬁts by adjusting its loan rates, and
R1 =







I − (1 − P2)SUS
P2
.
The politician must grant the “medium” entrepreneur a subsidy high enough to
make the application for a loan worthwhile. On the other hand, he wants to choose
SUS just high enough to raise the creditworthiness of “medium” entrepreneurs so
that they get access to private ﬁnance. This yields R2 ≥ Y , and in the limit R2 → Y .
Solving the three equations Π1,2 = 0, Π1 = 0, and R2 = Y for R1, R2 and SUS, we
get (4), (5) and (6).
Step 2: Derive the optimal kind of subsidy. With a subsidy as in (4), both
“medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs will produce. With a subsidy lower than in
(4), “medium” entrepreneurs could not produce, because the loan rate demanded by
banks would exceed the highest repayment possible, Y . As a consequence, produc-
tion decisions would be the same as without any subsidies. With a subsidy slightly
higher than (4), “medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs would produce, but tax
revenues would be wasted because the same production decisions could be achieved
with a lower subsidy. With an even higher subsidy (for instance an unlimited deﬁcit
guarantee that covers the total repayment), even “bad” entrepreneurs would get
access to loans.
20If the politician granted a subsidy unconditional on success, then the expected
amount of subsidy paid to “excellent” projects would be the same as that paid to
“medium” projects. In the case of a partial deﬁcit guarantee, the expected subsidy
paid to “excellent” projects is lower because their probability of success is higher
and that way the politician can economize on tax revenues. If the politician granted
a subsidy unconditional on production, then all entrepreneurs would take the sub-
sidy as a windfall gain. Even “bad” entrepreneurs would take a subsidy although
they cannot produce because they do not get access to private loans. This wastes
tax revenues and creates a disutility to the politician. Summarizing, we ﬁnd that,
given the politician uses a subsidy to inﬂuence production decisions, the method of
lemma 2 is the most eﬃcient way of using tax revenues.
Finally, let us derive the politician’s utility from implementing a direct, uninformed
subsidy. Both medium and excellent projects are carried out and take the subsidy.
An aggregate tax of
￿
m2 (1 − P2) + m1 (1 − P1)
￿
SUS must be levied to ﬁnance the
subsidy. Hence, the politician’s utility is given by (7). ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Step 1: Determine loan rates. In equilibrium, private
banks will grant loans only to “excellent” projects, hence they will oﬀer the most
favorable loan rates. As a consequence, bad entrepreneurs will apply at a private
bank. If they are rejected because they are “bad”, they know that they will never
get a loan (because the screening technologies of all banks are identical) so they
will not apply again. “Medium” entrepreneurs will ﬁrst apply at a private bank as
well, to have the chance to beneﬁt from the favorable loan rates if they are rated as
“excellent.” After being rejected, they apply at a subsidized bank, which ﬁnances
“medium” projects, since the expected loss it makes with each “medium” project
is compensated by a subsidy from the politician. Given the subsidy in (8), the
subsidized banks demand R2 = Y and we are exactly in the limiting case where
medium entrepreneurs only just participate.
“Excellent” entrepreneurs always apply for a loan at the private bank (the one with
the lowest rate). There is perfect competition between private banks for “excellent”
projects and this drives down their expected proﬁt to zero. Thus, the private bank’s
expected proﬁt is Π1 = m1 (P1 R1 − I) − c. Now Π1 = 0 implies (9).
Step 2: Derive optimal subsidy. The maximum loan rate that a subsidized bank
can demand is R2 = Y . In this case, the subsidized bank’s proﬁt function is given
by
Π
SL = m2 (P2 Y + S
SL − I) − m2 c. (19)
This term must be non-negative, otherwise the subsidized banker’s participation
constraint would be violated. Choosing SSL as in (8), we ﬁnd that the participation
constraint just holds, and the subsidized banker’s expected proﬁts are zero.
The subsidy must not be higher than necessary to satisfy the subsidized bankers’
participation and incentive compatibility constraints, otherwise tax revenues would
be wasted.
21Step 3: Restriction in competition is necessary. An important feature of the sub-
sidized bank is that competition with private banks must be restricted, for example,
by not allowing subsidized banks to oﬀer the same loan rates as private banks. If
there were unrestricted competition, the subsidized bank could give loans to “ex-
cellent” entrepreneurs and still collect the subsidy. This would allow them to make
positive proﬁts. Consequently, subsidized banks would grant loans to all “excellent”
and “medium” entrepreneurs. The aggregate subsidy to the subsidized bank would
then be higher than with direct subsidization of entrepreneurs, as in Section 3.2.
The politician derives utility from both “excellent” and “medium” projects. In
equilibrium, only “medium” entrepreneurs get the indirect subsidy through the sub-
sidized bank. Hence, the politician’s utility is given by (10). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Compare the politician’s utilities under the two sub-
sidization measures, USL
pol and UUS
pol. Straightforward algebraic manipulation shows
that USL
pol > UUS
pol as long as (11) holds. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Step 1: Determine the loan rates. The politician grants
a subsidy to entrepreneurs rated as “medium”. They can use the subsidy to signal
their rating. The proﬁt of a private bank from a subsidized entrepreneur is
Π2 = m2
￿




Under perfect competition, the loan rate will be
R2 =
I − (1 − P2)SIS
P2
.
Now, after entrepreneurs have received a subsidy and a loan, only entrepreneurs
rated as “excellent” by the credit specialist will apply for loans at private banks.
Entrepreneurs who were rated as “bad” will not apply because they know for sure




1 = m1 (P1 R1 − I) − m1 c,
hence, in market equilibrium the interest rate is R1 as in (9).
Step 2: Derive optimal subsidy. In order to analyze the size of the subsidy, we
need to ﬁnd out which entrepreneurs are screened by whom. All entrepreneurs will
apply for the subsidy, because they do not want to risk being rejected by the bank
and then lose the chance to get the subsidy. As a result, the aggregate screening cost
of the consultants is at least c. It is also possible to ﬁnd a contract that needs no
more than c: Employ one consultant and let him screen all entrepreneurs, employ
another consultant and let him control a random fraction η, pay the ﬁrst consultant
only if the second ﬁnds no mistakes, and let η converge to zero. Based on the ﬁrst
consultant’s report, the politician grants subsidies only to “medium” entrepreneurs.
Now private banks can observe the subsidy, and hence can give loans, without
22further screening, to these subsidized entrepreneurs, if the subsidy is suﬃciently
high. The politician can again set the subsidy such that the medium entrepreneurs’
participation constraint binds. Setting R2 = Y + SIS, we get SIS = I − P2 Y .
The public consultants cannot be the owners of private banks, but must be inde-
pendent agents. The politician cannot allow his public consultant to give loans to
entrepreneurs who get a subsidy: The public consultant would have, in terms of
information, a competitive advantage on the loan market compared to other private
banks. Therefore, he could always oﬀer a lower loan rate than the private bank and
make sure that he can grant the loan. Anticipating this, the public consultant could
tell the politician to subsidize even if an entrepreneur is already “excellent.” The
public consultant could proﬁt indirectly because of his competitive advantage. As a
consequence, both “excellent” and “medium” entrepreneurs would get the subsidy,
and the consultant’s advice would be worthless. Moreover, if the public consultant
gave the loan himself, the institutional setting might be indistinguishably close to a
subsidized bank.
Now the politician’s utility comprises of the following components. Projects are
carried out by “medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs. The subsidy is paid only
to “medium” entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the politician must pay a wage of c per
screened loan to his advisors (credit specialists). Consequently, the aggregate utility
is (14). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. We only need to compare USL
pol from (10) with UIS
pol from
(14). Using straightforward algebra, we ﬁnd that USL
pol always exceeds UIS
pol because
cdpol > m2 cdpol for any strictly positive c and dpol. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5. All entrepreneurs apply at the bank, but “medium” and
“bad” entrepreneurs will be rejected. They apply to the politician to become a
public employee. When making wage oﬀers, the politician needs to take into account
the outside option that diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs have. Entrepreneurs rated
as “medium” have expected proﬁts of zero, if they do not sell their project, because
they cannot get loans from private banks. Consequently, the politician does not
need to oﬀer more than an inﬁnitesimal wage to employ entrepreneurs rated as
“medium.” In the limiting case, he can pay zero wages. However, at any weakly
positive wage, entrepreneurs rated as “bad” will apply as well. Only entrepreneurs
rated as “excellent” will choose to remain independent at a zero wage. However,
the politician does not aim to employ entrepreneurs rated as “excellent” in the ﬁrst
place, since their projects are carried out without government intervention, because
they are sure to be ﬁnanced by private banks.
Although the politician does not need to pay for the projects, public ﬁrms do not
come free of cost. The politician needs to be liable for the debt of public ﬁrms,
otherwise investors would not grant loans. Because investors can observe that the
government guarantees the repayment, they do not need to screen public ﬁrms. They
get the same repayment in the case of success or failure, independent of the quality
23of the entrepreneurs within the ﬁrm. Therefore, they do not need a compensation
for risk, and every public ﬁrm has a loan rate of r = 1.
Hence, the politician’s expected payment for such bailouts is (m3 (1−p3)+m2 (1−
p2))I. However, the politician does not need to ﬁnance these payments completely
from taxes. He can use the revenues from the successful public ﬁrms, which amount
to (m3 p3 + m2 p2)(Y − I). Only the diﬀerence between the expected revenues and





mi (1 − pi)I − mi pi (Y − I),
which is equal to (15). Because entrepreneurs can still get a public job after a
rejection from a private bank, all entrepreneurs apply for loans, just like in the laissez
faire case. As a consequence, screening out “bad” and “medium” entrepreneurs is
just as costly for private banks, and the equilibrium loan rate is R1 = (I +c/m1)/P1
like in (2). ￿






dsoc m1 (1 − P1)(I − P2 Y ) − cm2 (1 − P2)(dsoc + 1)
1 − P2
,





soc = c(m1 + dsoc − dsoc m2 − m2),
which is positive if (18) holds. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Comparing the threshold values in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 shows that ¯ c2/¯ c1 = dsoc/(1 + dsoc), hence ¯ c1 > ¯ c2. ￿
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